Owners or Players?

The question has been constant for each and every hockey fan since a real threat of a lockout became apparent towards the end of the summer.

Who's side are you on: Owners or Players?

I couldn't choose. I assumed all along that a league that cancelled an entire season and players who sacrificed on average 20% of their career earnings only eight years ago wouldn't be so foolish as to miss games again. With "record revenues", a long-term U.S. television network deal, and plenty of buzz from another thrilling Stanley Cup playoff that culminated with a major market being crowned champions, I just didn't believe they could be so stupid. I thought a deal would get done. I thought a deal had to get done.

Did I think the owners initial offer that they unfathomably made public back in July was comically unreasonable? Absolutely. But I also assumed that with an average NHL player's salary sitting at $2.5 million, and the minimum at $550K, the NHLPA would comprehend how ridiculously well-compensated they are and be motivated to keep the gravy train rolling.

Even if the offer was a slap in the face (which again, it definitely was), it set the parameters for where the league wanted to go with the CBA and it was then up to the PA to get the best deal they could within those parameters. That's how these negotiations work, not just in hockey, but in all sports. In all business. The owners take the risk and therefore they have the ultimate say on how they will divide up their business. They set the framework and negotiations (eventually) progress from there.

But instead of common sense prevailing*, here we are days away from what should be the first night of the regular season, and we are somehow already guaranteed to miss games and might be on the verge of losing the whole season. Again.

*I along with 200,000 other hockey fans out there can mediate this stand-off in no time: gradual slide to 50/50 split of HRR; immediate increases to revenue sharing and re-distribution to lower-revenue teams; 8 year maximum length on contracts; same rules for free agency. Boom. Your welcome.

Instead of locking themselves in a room and chipping away at the gap that exists between the two sides, we've watched as months pass in between the swapping of proposals, and now weeks go by without any sort of meetings. The lack of urgency from either side is jarring.

I couldn't choose a side when the question was first asked months ago, and I'm no closer to an answer now. Mostly I'm just extremely frustrated with everyone involved.

I'm frustrated with the owners who have so little regard for the fans money and passion that they readily shut the game down every 8 or 10 years. I'm frustrated with the players who have copped out and gone overseas. I'm particularly frustrated with Mike Cammalleri for saying "you can go over there [to the KHL] and make millions and millions and millions of dollars to play hockey". Ummm, Mike, you do realize we can easily go online and figure out that you've earned about $26 million thus far in your NHL career, and have 2 more years at $7 million per on your contract. Would $40 million count as "millions and millions and millions of dollars to play hockey"? Because in my book it does.

And I'm frustrated with myself for already admitting that whenever this senseless lockout ends, I will be back going to games and watching them on television, just like nothing ever happened.

Did the Jets overpay for Pavelec?

Reason #947 why you don't need to pay a goalie: any team in hockey could have signed Mike Smith last summer for a measly $2 million a year.

Yes, the same Mike Smith that went 38-18-10 with a .930 SV% and 8 shutouts in the regular season before going Superman on us in the playoffs and nearly carrying the Coyotes all the way to Stanley Cup Finals, was the 28th highest paid goalie in hockey last year.

Which brings us to the 5 year/$19.5M contract the Winnipeg Jets and Ondrej Pavelec agreed to. There is no doubt Pavelec, despite posting the 34th best SV% in the NHL last year, is a decent goalie with the potential to improve. What there is doubt about is whether spending almost $4M a year on only half of your goalie position is a prudent use of cap space.

Below is the starting goalie salary for each of the last 10 Stanley Cup Finalists:

2012: Kings, Quick - $1.9M and Devils, Brodeur - $5.2M

2011: Bruins, Thomas - $6M and Canucks, Luongo - $10M

2010: Hawks, Niemi - $827K and Flyers, Leighton/Boucher - $750K (avg.)

2009: Penguins, Fleury - $3.5M and Red Wings, Osgood - $1.7M

2008: Red Wings, Osgood - $800K - and Penguins, Fleury - $1.6M

By my math that is 6 of the 10 playoff starters that were paid less than $2M a year, and going even further, 5 of the 10 teams (Detroit twice, Pens in '08, Hawks, Flyers and Kings) spent less than $3M total on the goaltending position. 

Recent history suggests a team that pinches pennies on the goalie position is actually more likely to reach the Finals than one that doesn't.

What Are They Worth?

Winnipeg has decisions to make on 12 free agent players

As the Jets struggle to remain a part of the Eastern conference playoff race and the end of their magical first year back in the NHL begins to appear on the horizon, management will soon be faced with deciding who among their group of nine unrestricted free agents will move forward with the team, as well as how their three restricted free agents might fit into the picture.

The biggest offseason contract decision at any position for GM Kevin Cheveldayoff will be that of what to do with winger Evander Kane. Coming off his entry level contract, which paid him an annual salary of $900k with bonuses that can take him all the way up to $3.1 million (depending on all sorts of things we won't get in to here), the 20 year-old has quickly become Winnipeg's most dangerous player and the one with the most upside. With 18 goals on the season, Kane's next score will tie his career high and a 30 goal campaign is within reach, which would represent continued progression for a player who will have increased his goal and point totals in each of his first three seasons. He's big and strong and his skill set includes elite level speed and a heavy, accurate shot with a quick release. Kane looks an awful lot like he's a dominant power forward waiting to happen.

However, he also lacks consistency and from the sounds of it, maturity. From trying to sell tweets to local businesses, to alienating teammates, to ignoring autograph seeking fans, Kane still has a lot of growing up to do and pegging his value at this stage of his evolution will be tricky. The average annual salary on a new contract will ultimately depend on the length, meaning a shorter deal of 2-3 years could be at about $3 million annually while anything longer than four years will cost considerably more per year. This negotiation could turn ugly and potentially even extend into training camp.

The other restricted free agent up front is Eric Fehr, who is earning $2.2 million this year to play an average on nine inconsequential minutes a night. The Jets took a chance on Fehr, acquiring him for a 2012 4th rounder in what was essentially a salary dump by the Capitals, but with just one lonely goal on the season another one-way NHL contract in Winnipeg is unlikely.

Among the UFA's at forward, Jim Slater ($1.1 million) and Tanner Glass ($750k) have become 2/3rds of what would be an excellent fourth line (if they weren't miscast as a third line), and both should expect new multi-year offers. Slater is the team's face-off specialist and a consistent 10 goal scorer so a similar salary on a two year deal would be appropriate. Glass has proven he can play the energy role and chip in offensively, which could force the Jets to go to at least three years in the $1 million per year range or risk losing him to another team.

Also unrestricted are Tim Stapleton ($525k), who has one huge fan in Claude Noel (I've given up trying to understand Stapleton on the point during the PP) and not many others, and Kyle Wellwood ($700k), who has two fans in his parents. The only way Wellwood should be on an NHL team is if he's playing in the top six, because as Jets fans (and Shark, Canuck and Leafs fans before them) have witnessed, in a third or fourth line role he is entirely ineffective. With that said, if Wellwood is in your top six permanently, as in not just an injury forced fill-in, well, say hello to the draft lottery. Bon voyage to them both.

On the back end Winnipeg has four UFA's, most notably Johnny Oduya, who is in the last year of a contract that pays him $4 million this season. After a very difficult first 10 games, which included a trip to the press box as a healthy scratch, Oduya has settled in nicely but will probably need to take a bit of a haircut on his current salary if he wants to stick around next year and beyond. I expect Cheveldayoff is already negotiating with Oduya's agent, and if no extension can be reached before the deadline, he could be dealt for a prospect or a pick.

The rest of the free agent defencemen, all of whom are unrestricted, include the oft-injured Randy Jones ($1.15M), the rehabbing Derek Meech ($700k), and the surprisingly dependable Mark Flood ($525k). Of the three Flood is the most obvious choice to continue with the team beyond this year, but each could easily be replaced if contract negotiations prove to be at all difficult. Jones, if he can stay healthy, could also be moved at the deadline.

In goal, both Ondrej Pavelec and Chris Mason are set to become free agents but a case can easily be made to stay the course, assuming Mason is willing to take a one year deal at slightly below his current $2.1 million salary. The offseason goalie market, particularly for aging veterans (Mason will turn 36 in April), has dried up considerably in recent years as teams recognize there are more quality goalies than jobs available, making bargain bin deals an option for any team willing to be patient (Vokoun, Elliott, Smith, to name just a few from last summer alone). All accounts suggest Mason is a positive presence in the dressing room and his performance, albeit in limited action, indicates he still has enough game to stop pucks when called upon. As long as he doesn't get greedy, it's a good bet he'll return.

Pavelec, despite his mediocre numbers (2.89 GAA and .910 SV%), has played very well overall and has established himself as a core piece of this team moving forward. He's coming off a deal that paid him only $1.3 million, and can expect a significant raise. Pavelec and his agent will likely point to his countryman Jaroslav Halak as a reasonable comparable and look for something in the neighbourhood of $4 million annually for at least four years. But as a restricted free agent, and with his misleading numbers, Cheveldayoff has an opportunity to lock Pavelec up with a team friendly contract, something closer to $3 million per year.

The Brains Behind the Bruins

In less than six years the NHL's best General Manager, Boston's Peter Chiarelli, has drafted, signed or acquired all but three of the 23 active players on his roster

When Peter Chiarelli was hired by the Bruins in May of 2006, he inherited a team that seemed to be going nowhere after it traded a dollar (Joe Thornton) for three quarters (Brad Stuart, Marco Sturm, Wayne Primeau) and finished 13th in the East.

Knowing the team had lost it's identity, Chiarelli immediately capitalized on a brutal mistake when the team he had just left, the Ottawa Senators, chose to re-sign Wade Redden over Zdeno Chara. That allowed Chara to hit the open market, and Chiarelli snapped him up with a five year deal that made the towering defenceman the NHL's highest paid rearguard ($7.5 million/year) and the new face of the Bruins.

That same summer Chiarelli also added free-agent Marc Savard, drafted Phil Kessel (5th), Milan Lucic (50th), and Brad Marchand (71st), and traded former Calder trophy winning goalie Andrew Raycroft to Toronto for Tuuka Rask. Even though Boston improved by only 2 points in the standings during Chiarelli's first season (06-07), the foundation for an elite team was quickly being put in place.

The next year (07-08) the Bruins returned to the playoffs, and as an eighth seed forced a game seven before losing in the opening round. They advanced to the second round the following two years (08-09 and 09-10) before becoming the Stanley Cup champions in 2010-11. That culminated a pretty good run.

Or so we thought.

Improbably, they've actually improved upon that form and have been steamrolling the NHL since Halloween. Boston is currently on a 24-4-1 run that has included a pair of 6-0 triumphs, as well as 7, 8, and 9 nothing games in their favour. They lead in goals scored and goals against, have the league's best road record, are the only team not to have allowed a shorthanded goal, and could have as many as 11 players score 15 or more goals.

Chiarelli has assembled hockey's deepest and most complete line-up and his Bruins are the odds-on favourite to become only the second team in the last 20 seasons to successfully defend their championship (Detroit in 96-97 and 97-98).

In addition to the moves outlined earlier, Chiarelli has made a number of shrewd high profile deals (Kessel for draft picks that became Tyler Seguin and Dougie Hamilton; Brad Boyes for Dennis Wideman, who eventually turned into Nathan Horton and Gregory Campbell), was rewarded for staying patient with holdover young talent (Patrice Bergeron and David Krejci), and identified and acquired the right veteran pieces to help short-term (Mark Recchi) and long (Rich Peverley, Chris Kelly, Andrew Ference, Dennis Seidenberg, Johnny Boychuk).

Even the goaltending situation, which not that long ago was a potential area of concern, appears to be working itself out beautifully for Chiarelli. After Tim Thomas provided exceptional value during his first three and a half years in Boston, Chiarelli signed the goalie to a four year $20 million contract extension that kicked in for the 09-10 season and would see Thomas through to his 40th birthday. As that season unfolded Thomas struggled and Rask emerged, and it looked like the Bruins might be stuck with a potentially crippling $5 million cap hit for an aging back-up goalie.

Instead, Thomas bounced back with a Vezina and Conn Smythe-winning performance last year, has posted nearly identical numbers again this year, and now has only one more very cap manageable season left on that extension. Meanwhile Rask has gained plenty of experience, and will be looking to increase his workload and salary at a time that should fit perfectly into Chiarelli's plans.

Which evidently include more Stanley Cup parades in Boston.

*Bergeron, Krejci, and Thomas were the only three players Chiarelli didn't bring to Boston.

What We've Learned So Far...

After a 7 game road-trip the Jets are still trying to develop an identity

Roughly one-fifth of the way through the regular season represents a good opportunity to gauge the performance of the new Winnipeg Jets. Through 15 games, this is what the play on the ice has told us...

Tanner Glass is the Jet whose stock has risen the most among fans

The 27 year-old rugged left-winger gives the most consistent effort night-in and night-out. Glass plays hard and has just about matched his entire point production from last year in Vancouver (73 games, 3 G and 7A). Third and fourth line type players are perhaps Winnipeg's deepest strength (back-handed compliment alert!), but Glass stands out among this group and Cheveldayoff and company should be looking to sign him to a new deal before he hits unrestricted free agency next summer. We knew Mark Stuart was going to be nasty to play against. Glass has been a pleasant surprise.

Ondrej Pavelec looks like a bona fide #1 goalie

The young netminder showed flashes of brilliance his last two years in Atlanta, but after a bit of a rough start (he allowed 9 goals on his first 54 shots this year), Pavs has really found his groove, starting every game on the road-trip and turning in five stellar performances. He is absolutely capable of stealing games for this team. The traditional numbers (3.31 GAA and .896 SV%) don't look good, but for 24 minutes a night Pavelec's playing in front of only one defenceman. Which brings us to...

Dustin Byfuglien is a defenceman! Yes, he is. No really.

We know this because coach Claude Noel continues to insist on playing him there. And we've also been told that he refuses to even consider playing forward. Never mind that his blatant disregard for: staying in position, choosing his spots to pinch, back-checking, and making quick stops and starts (nobody makes bigger loops back into action) have directly resulted in a number of goals against. Apparently that is part of the "learning process" that fans and Pavelec will have to suffer through. Logic might suggest that with a shortage of offensive punch up front, Byfuglien would provide more value to this team playing forward. Clearly logic is not part of this equation.

Jets management believe in Johnny Oduya, even if you don't

Other than Byfuglien, Oduya has been the favourite whipping boy for local fans. But when Winnipeg slapped an "A" on his jersey after Enstrom and Antropov went down, it was a clear signal that Jets management believe Oduya is considerably better than his early season play had indicated. And you know what? The vote of confidence has seemed to work as Oduya has been noticeably stronger on the puck since the move.

Alex Burmistrov is talented

The 20 year-old Russian has played very well in the young season, and his shiftiness along the boards and overall puck control skills are elite. But his consistency is already a question. After a six game point streak, he has registered just a single point over his last six games. Shades of Alex Zhamnov?

Jim Slater is over-achieving (production-wise)

And no one should expect it to continue. My apologies to his agent and family, but it's true. Slater scored 5 goals in his first 11 games and is on pace for a 30-goal season. His career history suggests he is a 10 goal scorer, so even getting to 15 this year would be pushing it.

Tim Stapleton should not be playing the point on the powerplay

No matter the circumstances. Stapleton has 0 goals and 3 assists in 11 games this year and 13 points in his NHL career. He is 29. Those don't seem like the qualifications for a powerplay specialist.

NHL Signing Day

With a $64 million cap and a 23 man roster, the average annual salary for a NHL player in 2011-12 will be just shy of $3 million

When the NHL salary cap came into effect after the lock-out, I began to ruthlessly decry every long-term (6 or more years) and/or big dollar ($6 million plus annually) contract that was signed.

I ridiculed the Rangers for signing Chris Drury, the Flyers for Daniel Briere, the Red Wings for Henrik Zetterberg and Johan Franzen, the Canucks for Roberto Luongo...the list went on and on (just like the actual contracts).

I always believed it was in a team's best interest to avoid those types of contracts at all costs. I understood the thinking behind tacking on years and paying the majority of the total contract at the front of the deal to reduce the cap hit, but I couldn't see the logic in committing more than five years to any player not named Crosby or Ovechkin. Injury, consistency, and complacency were all too much of a concern in my mind. Plus, I am apparently the only person who remembers the mess that was the NBA from 1996 - 2000. (So yes, my credibility took a hit with the 'It Won't Be Jets' and 'Manitoba Time' columns, but I did forsee the current NHL salary crisis a full three years ago.)

I also thought that tieing up as much as 20-25% of your cap space on 2-3 players would not allow a team to surround those top players with the quality depth needed to compete for a Stanley Cup.

I was adamant that teams who offered these types of contracts would regret them in the long run. I was positive that having more than a couple of players with annual salaries north of $5 million would cripple a team. I firmly believed you had to be very careful not to overpay anyone on your roster, and laughed at many contracts for borderline or slightly above average players who were signed to 3, 4 and $5 million contracts (Jeff Finger, Mike Commodore, Tuomo Ruutu, to name but a few).

I was deeply invested in the stockpiling draft picks/developing players/avoid over-paying for free agents philosophy. I believed you needed the roster flexibility that comes with putting together a team in this fashion, and if you didn't, well, at some point it would come back and bite you.

What I didn't see coming was a salary cap that would increase at a pace of almost 10% a year, from $39 million in 2006, all the way to $64 million in 2011. I didn't see the average, yes AVERAGE salary becoming almost $3 million in 2011.

Now when a player like Brooks Laich signs for $4.5 million a year, the sticker shock isn't nearly what it used to be. If the average salary is almost $3 million a year, then a slightly above average player is going to command at least slightly above $3 million a year. Simple logic.

The point is, worrying about fitting large salaries into your cap or slightly over-paying for an average player is suddenly a waste of time for fans and teams alike. Not only does a cap that keeps going up entice rich teams to be stupid, it also means those same teams have unlimited get-out-of-jail-free cards that can be used to give away bad contracts to teams needing to somehow get to the salary cap floor (which is a staggering $48 million for 2011-12).

All of which adds up to a humongous payday for Brad Richards.

I hope he signs with the Leafs.

Fixing Major League Baseball

After hearing about the Red Sox swooping in to sign Carl Crawford to a $142 million deal only days after trading for Adrian Gonzalez, I quickly went into yet another doomsday level of panic on behalf of Toronto Blue Jay fans everywhere.

Totally unfair. Ridiculous. What's the point?

It was the same old storyline: How can the Blue Jays ever realistically expect to compete when a maximum of two teams from one division make the playoffs, and the Jays reside in a division with the two biggest spenders in the sport?

Of the last 27 AL East teams to qualify for the playoffs, 24 of those births have gone to either the Red Sox or Yankees.

When the inevitable finally occurs and Cliff Lee accepts somewhere around $160 million from the Yankees in the next few days, the two Evil Empires will have spent around $530 million on five players (Crawford, Gonzalez, Jeter, Rivera, Lee) over the last two weeks. (The Red Sox have agreed to an extension with Gonzalez for about $154 million but won't announce it until opening day in order to save money on the luxury tax.)

In an attempt to have another baseball geek console me and remind me that the Rays have managed to sneak past both Boston and New York and into the playoffs twice in the last three years, I turned to my friend Marshall and quickly began texting up a storm. After several exchanges, neither of us were particularly hopeful that things would get better.

And that's when Marshall came up with gold.

Rather than luxury tax payments going into a pool that is then evenly divided between all the non-luxury taxed teams, why not have all (or at least the bulk) of luxury tax payments stay within the division? Why should the Pirates or Padres or Marlins get an equal amount of Boston and New York's luxury tax dollars when it's the Jays, Rays and Orioles who have to compete with them?

And wouldn't this model actually potentially curb the spending of these teams? If the Sox and Yanks knew that going into luxury tax territory would mean directly financing their AL East counterparts, wouldn't they think twice about their next big acquisition?

It's All Down Hill From Here

I began forecasting the slippery slope that the NHL is now fully sliding down back in 2008, long before the New Jersey Devils handed Ilya Kovalchuk the most alarming (and according to the powers that be, unethical) contract in the history of North American professional sport.

Back then, shortly after Vinny Lecavalier signed an 11 year $85 million contract, I wrote:

Are teams simply hoping the salary cap will continue to increase, year-after-year, without any recourse? Do they think by the time the last few remaining years of those deals come around, the cap will be $75M or $100M and the contract will actually look cheap? Can they automatically assume that one or two good seasons is enough to project a player's production 5 or 10 years down the line?

It's a nice thought, but...what if that doesn't happen? What if the annual salary cap, after rising a whopping 35% in 4 years, levels off and then a guy you've committed 7 or 8 years and $40-50M to doesn't fulfill expectations? Even worse, what if you have two guys like that? Or three?

It's a dark road the NHL is traveling down, and it's the same trail the NBA burned in the late 90's that lead to people like Jim McIlvane, Tariq Abdul-Wahad, and Austin Croshere earning some $127 million (combined) in salary. This is great news if you're Jeff Finger or Ron Hainsey or any other marginal player who may (or may not) have upside, but for everyone else it means bad times. Unless you cheer for Detroit, each contract from here on out has the potential to bury your franchise for the foreseeable future.

The NBA owners forced a lockout in 1999 not only to put a cap on player salaries, but also to implement the maximum length a contract could run. Teams were doling out 8, 10, even 12 year deals to stars and that in turn increased contract duration expectations around the league. Eager to keep young players away from free agency, GM's began paying on potential instead of production, and tacked on extra years without hesitation.

Remember the deals handed to Larry Johnson, Juwan Howard, Glenn Robinson and numerous other players who were either too young or still unproven? Remember the kind of damage they did to their respective teams?

Larry Johnson 12 years/$84M - 1994
Glenn Robinson 10 years/$68M - 1995
Donyell Marshall 9 years/$42M - 1994
Juwan Howard 7 years/$105M - 1996
Jayson Williams 7 years/$100M - 1999
Brian Grant 7 years/$84M - 2000
Vin Baker 6 years/$86.7M - 1997
Tim Thomas 6 years/$67M - 1999
Bryant Reeves 6 years/$65M - 1997
Antonio McDyess 6 years/$67M - 1998
Tom Gugliotta 6 years/$58.5M - 1998

In a few short years the entire landscape of the NBA changed. Instead of trading players you traded contracts. Where once you had almost every team competing, legitimately trying to win night in and night out, with most having a realistic shot of at least qualifying for the playoffs when training camp opened...all of a sudden you had a clear set of contenders and an equally clear set of pretenders who were fed to the lions and playing for the lottery from day one.

The NBA finally realized guaranteeing several tens of millions of dollars to athletes for a decade or more at a time, regardless of their performance, wasn't working out that well. Didn't exactly lead to motivation. Another factor was injuries. So they capped the length a contract could run for, and proceeded to shorten it again in the next round of CBA negotiating.

It was noted hockey genius Charles Wang who started this particular movement in the NHL, but it wasn't when he gave Rick Dipietro a 15 year contract in 2003. It actually began two years earlier when Wang signed (ahem) Alexei Yashin (10 years/$87.5M) and the Capitals inked Jaromir Jagr (7 years/$77M) to enormous contracts that neither player came close to playing out. In fact, both were paid to leave. Washington ate nearly half of Jagr's contract while he was wearing a Rangers jersey ($3.4M/year), and seven long years from now the Islanders will have squandered $17M in cap space for Yashin to stay home and continue not caring about hockey. Good investments?

In the years since we've seen several hockey players sign ridiculously long contracts and the situation is now unfolding just as it did in basketball. At first it's the stars: the hottest free agents and the best young players score huge extended deals. The rationale is obviously a move to circumvent the cap (more years at less dollars), and also, in the case of restricted free agents, to keep them away from other teams.

The problem isn't with the superstars getting big paydays, it's the length it comes with, and the effect that has on what everyone else can then demand.

As we look back on the recent history of the NBA, we can see the immediate future for the NHL. And it's not a pretty sight.

Now, two years later, the problem is coming to a head. The Kovalchuk deal, along with the contracts given to Roberto Luongo and Marian Hossa, while within the rules of the salary cap, are clearly designed to circumvent it. The tail-end of each contract, when each player will be well into his 40's, will pay those players minimal salaries. Because the contracts were signed prior to the player turning 35 years-old, if the player retires before the contract is fulfilled it doesn't count against the individual teams salary cap. Basically it allows a guy like Kovalchuk to be paid $95 million over the first 11 years of his deal while the Devils somehow only take a $6 million cap hit each year.

It's a loop-hole that will certainly be dealt with during the next round of CBA negotiations when a maximum contract length rule will be implemented. But unfortunately by then it might be too late. More than one quarter of NHL teams already have (at least) one contract on their books that will run more than a decade (Chicago, Detroit, New Jersey, NY Islanders, Philadelphia, Tampa Bay, Vancouver, Washington), and who knows how many more will follow suit before the system can be corrected?

NHL Free Agency: Winners and Losers

The Losers:

New York Rangers
Glen Sather has been the Rangers GM since 2000 and during his nine seasons in charge the Blueshirts have made four playoff appearances and never advanced past the second round. Slats has signed three of the worst contracts currently in hockey (Drury, Gomez, Redden) and just massively overpaid for Derek Boogard (4 years, $6.6 million), who hasn't scored a goal in his last 190 games. There is no question that Boogard is one bad hombre who will protect his teammates and strike fear in opposing players, but he plays about five minutes a game. Crazy.

Vancouver Canucks
Too long for Dan Hamhuis (six years), too much for Manny Malholtra ($2.5 a year), and it may end up costing them Mason Raymond. I can totally understand adding either Hamhuis or Ballard, but grabbing both of them seems redundant. It looks like Mike Gillis, who now has six defenceman earning at least $3.25 million, has gone to the Brian Burke school of building a blue line. Obviously, that is not a good thing.

Ottawa Senators
If I were a Sens fan and was looking at paying a total of $15.3 million (or roughly 26% of my cap space) next year to Alex Kovalev, Sergei Gonchar and Pascal Leclaire...well, let's just say Bryan Murray would not be on my Christmas card list. Gonchar has been one of if not the elite point producing defenceman in the league over the last ten years, but at 36, and after playing only 87 of a possible 164 games the last two years, it just doesn't make a lot of sense to give him three years AND a raise.

Buffalo Sabres
Over-paid for a washed up Jordan Leopold (three years, $9 million) instead of spending an extra $375k a year to keep Henrik Tallinder even though they have more than $10 million in available cap space. This was dumb on two levels: 1) Tallinder is 1000 times the player that Leopold is, and 2) he paired with and mentored Tyler Myers all of last year and allowed him to blossom into a bonafide force. Buffalo will need the pre-Olympic version of Ryan Miller just to squeak into the playoffs next year.

The Winners:

Tampa Bay Lightning
Stevie Y knows what he's doing. The rookie GM somehow convinced the Flyers to take Andrej Mezaros off his hands (Paul Holmgren and his scouting staff didn't watch Tampa play the last two years?) and then more than replaced him with a superior and cost-effective Pavel Kubina (two years, $7.7 million), rewarded a deserving Martin St.Louis with an extension and topped it off by signing a quality goalie (Dan Ellis) to a short-term deal (two years, $3 million). If Yzerman manages to send Vinny Lecavalier to LA, he may have won the 2010-11 GM of the Year Award before the season even starts.

New Jersey Devils
Anton Volchenkov was made to play in the Devils system and while the length of his new contract might be a little longer than I would like (six years), the price was more than fair ($4.25 million per). Sweet Lou also added Henrik Tallinder to give them their best defensive unit since the Scott Stevens/Scott Niedermayer days. If the Kovalchuk deal goes through and they don't have to give up Zajac to make room for him, I very much like Jersey's chances next year.

San Jose Sharks
After nine years with Evgeni Nabokov as their starter that resulted in limited post-season success, it was absolutely the right time to let him walk. The fact that Doug Wilson then jumped onboard the cheap goaltending train makes it even better. Antero Nittimaki (two years, $4 million) is definitely good enough to win with, and for all we know, Thomas Greiss might be too.

Calgary Flames
Darryl Sutter has been getting absolutely crushed by the Canadian media, particularly for his moves on July 1st, but I actually like both of the signings. Olli Jokinen is coming off of two disappointing seasons and never quite found his groove in Calgary during his first go-around, but at that price ($3 million per for only two years) I think the risk is worth the potential reward. Same thing goes for Alex Tanguay, who will earn $1.7 million on a one year deal and can also play in the Flames top-6.

The NHL's Slippery Slope

Another day, another lucrative, long-term contract generously served up by a league that obviously can't (or won't) help itself.

This time Vinny Lecavalier is the recipient and will earn $8.556 Million as a 38 year-old playing out the final year of his (rumoured) 9 year $77M contract. In the year 2018.

That massive deal follows in the footsteps of several other recent signings (sidebar on the right) that indicate NHL general managers are collectively changing the way they do business. Or they're all crazy. Has to be one of the two.

Are teams simply hoping the salary cap will continue to increase, year-after-year, without any recourse? Do they think by the time the last few remaining years of those deals come around, the cap will be $75M or $100M and the contract will actually look cheap? Can they automatically assume that one or two good seasons is enough to project a player's production 5 or 10 years down the line?

It's a nice thought, but...what if that doesn't happen? What if the annual salary cap, after rising a whopping 35% in 4 years, levels off and then a guy you've committed 7 or 8 years and $40-50M to doesn't fulfill expectations? Even worse, what if you have two guys like that? Or three?

It's a dark road the NHL is traveling down, and it's the same trail the NBA burned in the late 90's that lead to people like Jim McIlvane, Tariq Abdul-Wahad, and Austin Croshere earning some $127 million (combined) in salary. This is great news if you're Jeff Finger or Ron Hainsey or any other marginal player who may (or may not) have upside, but for everyone else it means bad times. Unless you cheer for Detroit, each contract from here on out has the potential to bury your franchise for the foreseeable future.

The NBA owners forced a lockout in 1999 not only to put a cap on player salaries, but also to implement the maximum length a contract could run. Teams were doling out 8, 10, even 12 year deals to stars and that in turn increased contract duration expectations around the league. Eager to keep young players away from free agency, GM's began paying on potential instead of production, and tacked on extra years without hesitation.

Remember the deals handed to Larry Johnson, Juwan Howard, Glenn Robinson and numerous other players who were either too young or still unproven? Remember the kind of damage they did to their respective teams?

Larry Johnson 12 years/$84M - 1994
Glenn Robinson 10 years/$68M - 1995
Donyell Marshall 9 years/$42M - 1994
Juwan Howard 7 years/$105M - 1996
Jayson Williams 7 years/$100M - 1999
Brian Grant 7 years/$84M - 2000
Vin Baker 6 years/$86.7M - 1997
Tim Thomas 6 years/$67M - 1999
Bryant Reeves 6 years/$65M - 1997
Antonio McDyess 6 years/$67M - 1998
Tom Gugliotta 6 years/$58.5M - 1998

In a few short years the entire landscape of the NBA changed. Instead of trading players you traded contracts. Where once you had almost every team competing, legitimately trying to win night in and night out, with most having a realistic shot of at least qualifying for the playoffs when training camp opened...all of a sudden you had a clear set of contenders and an equally clear set of pretenders who were fed to the lions and playing for the lottery from day one.

The NBA finally realized guaranteeing several tens of millions of dollars to athletes for a decade or more at a time, regardless of their performance, wasn't working out that well. Didn't exactly lead to motivation. Another factor was injuries. So they capped the length a contract could run for, and proceeded to shorten it again in the next round of CBA negotiating.

It was noted hockey genius Charles Wang who started this particular movement in the NHL, but it wasn't when he gave Rick Dipietro a 15 year contract in 2003. It actually began two years earlier when Wang signed (ahem) Alexei Yashin (10 years/$87.5M) and the Capitals inked Jaromir Jagr (7 years/$77M) to enormous contracts that neither player came close to playing out. In fact, both were paid to leave. Washington ate nearly half of Jagr's contract while he was wearing a Rangers jersey ($3.4M/year), and seven long years from now the Islanders will have squandered $17M in cap space for Yashin to stay home and continue not caring about hockey. Good investments?

In the years since we've seen several hockey players sign ridiculously long contracts and the situation is now unfolding just as it did in basketball. At first it's the stars: the hottest free agents and the best young players score huge extended deals. The rationale is obviously a move to circumvent the cap (more years at less dollars), and also, in the case of restricted free agents, to keep them away from other teams.

The problem isn't with the superstars getting big paydays, it's the length it comes with, and the effect that has on what everyone else can then demand.

As we look back on the recent history of the NBA, we can see the immediate future for the NHL. And it's not a pretty sight.